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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
          What is the ultimate source of inflation still remains as a central question for economists. 
It is reflected in the recent heated debate over the fiscal theory of the price level. Advocates of 
the FTPL are Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1997, 2001), Woodford (1995, 2001) or Chochrane 
(1998a, 1998b, 2000), and critics to the theory are Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), McCallum 
(2001, 2003), Buiter (2002, 2004) or Niepelt (2004).
1  Although a theoretical literature, e.g. 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the literature of the FTPL, have predicted that fiscal deficits 
cause inflation, empirical evidence on the inflationary effects of fiscal deficits is inconclusive.
2 
On the other hand, it is the stylized fact that the growth of money and inflation are closely 
related  in  the  long-run,  but  causality  may  run  from  inflation  to  money.
3  Kocherlakota  and 
Phelan (1999) argues that the FTPL is not falsifiable and the question whether the FTPL is 
correct can not be answered using data because the FTPL is about the behavior of a government 
for unobserved prices. 
          Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) stresses that the key force behind the FTPL is that a 
government is fundamentally different from households. To find the true mechanism of inflation, 
therefore, we should make an investigation into government’s behavior more extensively. How 
different  are  governments  from  households?  What  motives  do  governments  have  for 
expenditure, tax, seigniorage and borrowing? If there is fundamental heterogeneity in behavior 
between a government and households, it may be the key to the source of inflation. In the 
aforementioned  literature,  however,  governments’  behavior  does  not  appear  to  be  modeled 
sufficiently,  and  governments  are  often  described  a  priori,  e.g.,  as  agents  who  are  merely 
                                                           
1  See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) and Gordon and Leeper (2002). 
2  See e.g. Karras (1994), Darrat (2000), or Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002). 
3  See e.g. Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002).   2 
obliged to commit themselves to budget constraints without maximizing anything.
4 
          One of the reasons why many economists are skeptical about the FTPL may be that the 
concept of non-Ricardian policy is too general and non-Ricardian policies include too many 
fiscal policy rules, many of which may be unrealistic and absurd and lead to unfavorable and 
unacceptable consequences. To be too general may result in an impression that the FTPL is an 
extreme theory and merely a meaningless and useless gimmick. However, although most of the 
non-Ricardian policies may be meaningless and useless, there may be some non-Ricardian fiscal 
policy rules that play important roles in reality. Hence, it will be necessary to pin down such a 
non-Ricardian fiscal policy rule that may prevail in reality and, more importantly, is not an ad 
hoc exogenous fiscal policy rule but derived from optimization of government. We need, so to 
speak,  a  microfoundation  of  the  Fiscal  Theory  of  the  Price  Level.  What  do  governments 
maximize in the process of expenditure and taxes if they are rational agents, while households 
maximize their expected utilities and firms maximizes their expected profits?
5  Inconclusiveness 
of the argument over the ultimate source of inflation may arise from this insufficient treatment 
of  government’s  behavior  in  models.  To  model  explicitly  and  clearly  a  government’s 
maximization problem may be the key to solve the problem of the ultimate source of inflation. 
          In consideration of the above arguments, the paper examines the model that explicitly 
includes  a  government’s  maximization  problem  in  the  conventional  general  equilibrium 
framework.  To  do  this,  first  it  is  necessary  to  examine  preferences  and  objective/utility 
functions of governments. According to the literature of political economy, e.g. Downs (1957) 
and Alesina and Cukierman (1990), it will not be rare that government’s preferences are not 
identical  to  those  of  a  representative  household.  For  example,  governments  are  chosen  by 
                                                           
4  Of  course,  in  most  models  regarding  monetary  policy,  a  monetary  authority  is  assumed  to  maximize  its  loss 
function that consists of the rates of inflation and unemployment or output gaps as well as the target inflation rate.   
5  Cochrane (1998b) examines the case that a fiscal authority has an objective to minimize the volatility of inflation 
rate.   3 
people not only from an economic point of view but from a political point of view, and in 
countries  where  income inequality  is  high, populist  parties  whose self  senses of values  are 
different from that of a representative household, will often win elections (more reasons are 
explained  in  the  section  II).  More  importantly,  the  paper  adopts  the  Leviathan  view  of 
government, the most prominent reference of which is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). In this 
view, governments maximize their expected utilities with their own unique utility functions and 
rates of time preference, and the utility function of government consists of different factors from 
those of which the utility function of household consists. 
          The  explicit  inclusion  of  a  government’s  maximization  problem  produces  a  simple, 
clear-cut and beautiful result: inflation is ultimately caused by the difference of the rates of time 
preference between a government and households. If the time preference rate of a government is 
higher than that of a representative household, the rate of inflation accelerates, and in reverse if 
the time preference rate of a government is lower than that of a representative household, the 
rate of disinflation and in some cases deflation accelerates. This is an inevitable consequence of 
heterogeneity  in  time  preference  rates  between  a  government  and  households.
6  This  simple 
mechanism bridges the gap between the real world and the nominal world. Without inflation, an 
economy can not be stable, and thus inflation plays a crucial role to stabilize an economy, i.e. to 
reconcile the contradiction in the time preference rates that will make rational agents confuse 
and  unable  to  plan  future  economic  activities  rationally.  The  point  is  that  if  there  is 
heterogeneity  in  time  preference  rates  between  a  government  and  households,  it  will  be 
impossible to construct a stable model without inflation, simply because there will be no other 
way to reconcile the contradiction in the time preference rates than inflation. 
          This clear-cut result sheds new light on various phenomena of inflation, e.g. persistence, 
hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation, deflation and so on. For example, the model in the 
                                                           
6  Since  Becker  (1980),  it  has  been  well  known  that,  if  there  is  heterogeneity  in  time  preference  rates  among 
households, a somber and extreme situation emerges, i.e., the most patient household owns all wealth.   4 
paper has the intrinsic nature of persistence, i.e. inflation rates in the model have a unit root. 
Because the New Keynesian theory faces difficulties to explain the nature of persistence, the 
result that the model has the intrinsic nature of persistence will significantly enhance plausibility 
of the model.
7  For another example, the model in the paper can be seen as a unified model that 
explains  various  types  of  inflation,  e.g.  hyperinflation,  chronic  inflation,  disinflation  and 
deflation, by a single mechanism such that different combinations of the time preference rates of 
government and households generate various types of inflation.     
          This  result  also  gives  us  new  interpretations  of  the  existing  various  inflation  related 
models. For example, if money is included in the model, positive nominal interest rates are 
predicted,  which  is  in  sharp  contrast  to the  Friedman  rule.  For  another  example,  the  paper 
predicts  that  the  argument  between  the  FTPL  and  the  quantity  theory  will  be  infinitely 
inconclusive, because both theories equally correspond to a special case of the model in the 
paper, i.e. the utility of a government is constant in any time, and thus the optimality conditions 
of  the  government  are  reduced  to  only  two  equations,  i.e.  the  budget  constraint  and  the 
transversality condition, while five equations are necessary for a more general utility function of 
government. Hence, the model in the paper is different from the FTPL in the sense that the 
budget constraint is still a constraint of a government that is used when the government solves 
its  optimization  problem  and  also  in  the  sense  that  inflation  is  caused  not  by  deficits  or 
accumulated government’s debts but by the time preference rate of government. Nevertheless, 
in the sense that the price level is determined not by monetary factors but by fiscal factors, the 
conclusion in the paper is same as that of the FTPL and the model in the paper can be regarded 
as presenting a microfoundation of the FTPL.   
          The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  II,  first  government’s  preferences  are 
examined and the optimization problem of government that should be included in the model is 
specified. The model including the optimization problem of government produces a simple and 
                                                           
7  See e.g. Holden and Driscoll (2003).   5 
clear-cut result: inflation rates are determined by the difference of the time preference rates 
between a government and households. It is shown that inflation has the intrinsic nature of 
persistence, i.e. inflation rates have a unit root, and that the model can be seen as a unified 
model that explains various types of inflation, e.g. hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation 
and deflation, by a single mechanism. In section III, the model is compared with the existing 
various models regarding inflation: the FTPL, the monetary policy rule, the Phillips curve, the 
optimal fiscal policy, and the theory of money. It is shown that the model in the paper can be 
regarded as presenting a microfoundation of the FTPL. Finally some concluding remarks are 
offered in section IV. 
 
II. THE SOURCE OF INFLATION 
 
1. The optimization problem of government 
1.1 Heterogeneity in preferences between a government and households 
          Although  households  are  modeled  to  maximize  their  expected  utilities  and  firms  are 
modeled to maximize their profits, it is neglected in many models what governments maximize. 
In  the  theory  of  optimal  fiscal  policy,  a  government  is  assumed  to  maximize  households’ 
expected utilities, but in many models governments are not assumed to maximize anything
8. 
Probably, in democratic countries, a political party that has  very different preferences from 
usual  people  may  not  win  elections,  therefore  in  the  long  run  the  averaged  preferences  of 
governments  may  be  similar  to  those  of  a  representative  household.  In  addition,  because 
politicians are generally motivated by a desire that they want to hold office as long as possible, 
                                                           
8  The assumption in the theory of optimal fiscal policy that a government maximizes households’ expected utilities is 
introduced  for  the  purpose  of  normative  analyses.  Whether  in  reality  governments  behave  according  to  the 
assumption is another question.     6 
there will be complete policy convergence in two-party system.
9  However, it is not guaranteed 
that the preferences of a government are identical to those of a representative household in any 
time for several reasons. For example, the converged policy does not reflect the mean voter but 
the  median  voter.
10  Furthermore,  and  more  importantly,  as  Alesina  and  Cukierman  (1990) 
argues,  there  is  the  second  motive:  politicians  have  preferences  over  policy  issues,  thus 
complete  policy  convergence  may  not  be  the  electoral  equilibrium.  The  reasons  why  the 
preferences are different between a government and households are summed up as follows.   
       
  (i) Governments are chosen from among many political parties not only from an economic 
point of view but from a political point of view. Each political party has its own unique self 
sense  of  values  regarding  both  economic  and  political  points  of  view.  Hence,  it  is  not 
guaranteed that a political party, whose self sense of values regarding the economic point of 
view is identical to the representative households’ preferences, wins an election, due to the self 
sense of values of the party regarding the political point of view. 
  (ii) A representative household’s preferences are the aggregated preferences of all households. 
Hence it will be seen as the mean of households. However, governments are usually chosen by 
the  median  of  households  under  proportional  representation  systems.  This  factor  may 
particularly play an important role in developing countries where income inequality is very high 
and populist parties often win elections.
11 
  (iii) When elections are held, people expect each party’s self sense of values using only limited 
information. Hence, there will be errors in their expectations. Since only one party can win each 
election, then the law of large number can not be applied in each election, and thus, although 
                                                           
9  See the literature of the policy convergence, most of which base upon Downs (1957).   
10  See the literature of the median voter theorem, e.g. also Downs (1957) 
11  See the literature of the delay in reforms, e.g. Rodrik (1996), Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), and 
Alesina and Drazen (1991).   7 
households want to chose a party that has the same preferences as a representative household, 
those of the chosen party may be different from those of the representative household due to 
errors in expectations.
12  It was often seen that after an election, a party that won the election 
and  formed  a  government  raised  tax  rates  although  it  appealed  to  constituents  during  the 
election that it would never raise tax rates. 
  (iv) Current voters can not bind the choices of future voters. If there is disagreement between 
current  and  future  majorities,  time  inconsistency  problem  in  choosing  a  party  that  forms  a 
government will arise. If current voters aware this possibility, they may vote more myopically 
compared to their own rates of impatience in private economic activities.
13   
  (v)  When  the  preferences  of  a  representative  household  changes,  the  preferences  of  a 
government and the household become different until the next election is held although initially 
those of the government and the household were identical.
14 
  (vi) There is a possibility that a government changes its policy stance including its preferences, 
e.g. as a result of power struggles in a party that forms a government, although initially those of 
the government and a representative household were identical. 
  (vii) There is a possibility that the time preference rates of a government and a representative 
household must be different to control inflation rates. This possibility is examined in detail later. 
 
          Hence, it may be the usual situation that the preferences of a government are different 
from those of a representative household. If they are different, is it rational for a political party 
that forms a government not to maximize its own expected utility? Does the political party have 
an incentive not to maximize its expected utility? If we assume rationality of political parties 
and governments as we usually assume rationality of households and firms, we should assume 
                                                           
12  See e.g. Alesina and Cukierman (1990). 
13  See e.g. Tabellini and Alesina (1990). 
14  See e.g. Harashima (2004a, c).   8 
that the political party that forms a government maximizes its own expected utility in any time 
even though its preferences are different from those of a representative household. 
          Furthermore, there is a more important difference between a government and households 
regarding  their  utilities.  If  governments  have  only  the  first  motive  argued  in  Alesina  and 
Cukierman (1990), i.e. to hold office as long as possible, only consumption and leisure hours of 
households  may  matter  for  governments.  However,  if  governments  have  also  the  second 
ideological motive, i.e. to have preferences over policy issues, government expenditure and tax 
revenue  that  reflect  policy  achievements  may  play  more  important  roles  in  their  utilities. 
Governments  will  derive  utility  from  expenditure  that  makes  their  ideological  policies 
achievable and disutility from taxes that are costs necessary to achieve their ideological policies. 
This is the Leviathan view of government, the most prominent reference of which is Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980).
15  In this view, government expenditure is not a tool to maximize the 
private consumption of households, but is a tool to achieve policy objectives of the party that 
forms a government.
16  Governments are not presumed to be managed by politically neutral 
bureaucrats who are obliged to mechanically maximize the expected utility of a representative 
household in any time and under any political party that forms a government. Government’s 
behavior  assumed  in  the  FTPL  reflects  an  aspect  of  the  Leviathan  government  that  acts 
independently regardless of households’ behavior.
17  The Leviathan view generally requires the 
explicit inclusion of government expenditure, tax revenue, or related government activities in 
                                                           
15  There are two extremely different views regarding government’s behavior. One is the Leviathan view and the 
other is the benevolent view. In the benevolent view, it is assumed that a government maximizes the expected utility 
of a representative household. 
16  It is in contrast to the models of the optimal fiscal policy that generally adopt the benevolent view, in which tax 
revenues are treated as a tool to maximize the private consumption of households.   
17  Christiano  and  Fitzgerald (2000) argues  that  non-Ricardian policies are  corresponding  to  the  type  of  policies 
contemplated in the Ramsey literature, in which governments are viewed as selecting their policies and committing 
themselves to those policies in advance before prices are determined in markets.   9 
the utility function of government.
18  The paper adopts the Leviathan view firstly because the 
paper  focuses  on  the  second  motive  of  government  and  secondly  because  the  benevolent 
government can be seen as a special case of the  Leviathan government, i.e. the benevolent 
government  is  a  special  case  such  that  its  preferences  are  coincident  with  those  of  a 
representative household although in general the preferences of a government are not identical 
to those of the household. 
          In addition, there is another difference between a government and households. Control 
variables  for  households  are  consumption  and  leisure  hours,  but  control  variables  for 
governments are governments’ expenditure and tax revenue. This important difference of nature 
also may require the explicit inclusion of government’s expenditure and tax revenue in the 
utility function of government.   
          Taking the above arguments into account, the following environment is assumed in the 
paper.  Each  government  is  chosen  from  among  political  parties  by  elections  under  a 
proportional representation system for a finite term. Each political party has its own unique 
utility function and rate of time preference that are different from those of the other political 
parties. The utility function and the rate of time preference of a government are those of the 
chosen  political  party  during  its  term.  Hence,  firstly  government’s  preferences  are  not 
necessarily  identical  with  those  of  a  representative  household,  and  secondly  government’s 
preferences in a country are time-variable.   
 
1.2 The utility function of government 
          A  Leviathan  government  derives  utility  from  government’s  expenditure  for  its  own 
purposes  that  are  different  from  those  of  a  representative  household.  Hence,  the  larger  the 
expenditure the happier the Leviathan government will be. On the other hand, if the government 
thinks that raises of tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy and will reduce its probability to 
                                                           
18  See e.g. Edwards and Keen (1996).   10 
be reelected, the Leviathan government will feel less happy, because the government expects 
that  if  it  loses  power  it  can  not  expend  money  for  its  purposes  anymore.  The  Leviathan 
government may consider taxes as necessary costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own 
purposes. The expenditure and taxes in the utility function of government may be analogous to 
consumption and labor hours in the utility function of household. In addition, the consumption 
and labor hours are both control variables and similarly the government’s expenditure and tax 
revenue are also both control variables.   
          Taking into the above arguments, the utility function of government can be expressed as 
( ) t t
G x g u , ,










x = is  the  real  tax 
revenue of government in period t while Gt is nominal government expenditure, Xt is nominal 
tax  revenue,  and  pt  is  the  price  level  in  period  t.
20  In  addition,  it  can  be  assumed  by  the 
































                                                           
19  It may be possible to assume that partially governments are benevolent. In this case the utility function of a 
government can be assumed to be  ( ) t t t t
G l c x g u , , ,   where t c is the real consumption and  t l   is the leisure hours 
of a representative household. However, in case of lump-sum tax, government’s policies do not affect the steady state 
consumption and leisure hours. In this case the utility function can be assumed to be  ( ) t t
G x g u , . 
20  Instead, it is possible to assume a loss function for a fiscal authority similar to that for a monetary authority, e.g. 
the Taylor rule. This kind of loss functions penalizes variations in output around its steady state level. Nonetheless, 
the paper does not adopt this kind of loss functions because it seems that this kind of loss functions can not deal with 
the fundamental difference between monetary and fiscal policies appropriately. Monetary authority’s instrument, i.e. 
the nominal interest rate, has nothing to do with the utility of monetary authority. It is merely an instrument. However, 
a fiscal authority will derive utility from its instrument, i.e. government’s expenditure as was discussed above if 
governments have the second motive argued in Alesina and Cukierman (1990). Hence, the level of government’s 
expenditure should be directly included in the utility/loss function of fiscal authority.   11 
2. The model 
          The  utility  function  of  a  government  is  ( ) t t































u . All variables are expressed in per capita terms. It is assumed that 
G u is a constant relative risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate of time preference 
is 
G θ . The tax is assumed to be lump-sum. The budget constraint of the government is   
t t t t t t S X G R B B − − + = &  
where  Bt  is  the  accumulated nominal  government bonds, Rt is the nominal  interest rate for 
government bonds, and St is the nominal amount of seigniorage in period t. Rt is composed of 
the real interest rate rt and the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   such that 
e

















=   is the inflation rate in period t. By 
divided by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to   
t t t t t
t
t s x g R b
p
B
− − + =
&
, 
and it is equivalent to   
( ) t t t t t t t t t t t t t t s x g π R b π b s x g R b b − − + − = − − − + = & . 
          Hence, the optimality problem of the government is   






0 0  
subject to   
( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & . 
          On the other hand, a representative household maximizes the following expected utility: 






0 0  
where 
P u   and 
P θ   are the utility function and the rate of time preference of the representative   12 
household, subject to the following constraint:   
( ) t t t t g c k f k − − = & , 
where  ( ) • f   is the production function,  t k   is the real capital per capita, and  t c   is the real 
consumption  per  capita.
21  The  constraint  means  that  the  output  ( ) t k f   in  each  period  is 
demanded  for  the  private  consumption  ct,  the  private  investment  t k &   and  the  government 
expenditure gt. The government expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative 
household because the government is a Leviathan. It is assumed that  0 >
′ P u   and  0 <
″ P u  
and the number of population is constant. 
          Initially, this model does not include money and the seigniorage St is assumed to be an 
exogenous variable. The model is extended to one that includes money in sub-section III.5.   
 
3. The law of motion for price   
3.1 The consequence of heterogeneity between a government and households 
          The optimality conditions of both the government and the representative household yield 
the  following  important  and  clear-cut  results,  which  are  inevitable  consequences  of 






t b θ θ π π − + = ,   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and 
0 = t k & . 
 
Proof: Let Hamiltonian  H   be 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t
G
t t
G s x g π R b λ t θ ,x g u H − − + − + − = exp   where  t λ   is  a  costate  variable. 
                                                           
21  The constraint is equivalent to  ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t π R b s x b c k f k − + − − − − = & & .   13 
The optimality conditions of the government’s above problem are   
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exp ,         
(3)  ( ) t t t t π R λ λ − − = & ,     
(4)  ( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & ,             
(5)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t b λ .             























































































































&   at  the  steady  state  such  that 
0 = t g &   and  0 = t x & , and thus  t
e
t b t
G π π r θ − + = , . 
          Here, by the optimality conditions of the representative household, 
P
t θ r =   at the steady 
state such that  0 = t c & ,  0 = t k &   and  0 = t g & . 
          Hence t
e
t b




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   at  the  steady  state  such  that 
0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & .     
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
   14 
          Under the following assumption that the expected rate of inflation will perfectly realize, 




t b θ θ π π − + = ,   determines  the  path  of  rates  of  inflation, 
disinflation or deflation and thus depicts the basic law of motion for price.   
 
Assumption: 
  (A1) The expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   in period t is formed by expected 

















&   where  t E   is  the 
expectation operator. 










t v dv π E π dv π .   
 
Assumption (A1) means that the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation 
e
t b π ,   equals 
the  expected  general  price  change  during  period  t,  and  because  Rt  is  based  on  the  budget 
constraint of the government  t t t t t t S X G R B B − − + = & , assumption (A1) is quite natural one. 
Assumption (A2) simply assumes rational expectations. 
 
Corollary  1: 
G
t t θ π R = −   at  the  steady  state  such  that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and 
0 = t k & .   
 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
That is, the real interest rate for government bonds estimated using the current inflation rate is 
the time preference rate of the government. 
   15 
Lemma  1:  If  and  only  if 
t





− =   at  the  steady  state,  then  the  transversality 
condition (5)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t b λ   holds.   
 
Proof:    Substituting the results of theorem 1 and corollary 1 into conditions (3) and (4) and 
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# is a certain constant. 




lim   for the transversality 
condition (5) to be held. 
          Here,  by  condition  (4), 
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  at the 
steady  state  then  t b   diminishes  to  zero,  then  the  transversality  condition  (5)  can  not  hold 






























lim   where C
## is a 
certain constant. Thereby the transversality condition (5) also can not hold. 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
If the transversality condition is satisfied, then, at the steady state, the increase of government’s 
debts  t
Gb θ , i.e. the real interest rate of government bonds estimated using the current inflation   16 
rate 
G θ   times  accumulated  debts  t b ,  is  equal  to  the  amount  of  reduction  of  debts 
( ) t t t s x g − − −   in any period. 
          Inflation rates will not have seasonal cycles, and therefore the following assumption will 
be seen as quite natural. 
 
Assumption: (A3)  t π   does not have any cycle of length 1. 
 
Lemma 2: If and only if  ( )
P G
t ζ t θ θ ζ π π − + = + 2 ,  t π   does not have any cycle of length 1.   
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
          Hence,  under  assumptions  (A1)  and  (A2),  inflation  rates  develop  according  to  the 
following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2:  ( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 &   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and 
0 = t k &   if 
t





− =   at the steady state. 
 




t v θ θ π dv π − = − ∫
+1
  at the steady 




− = +1 . 
          Here, by lemma 2,  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − + = + 2 1 . Hence,  ( )
P G
t t
t θ θ π π
dt
dπ
− = − = + 2 1 . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 2 shows the consequence of heterogeneity in preferences between a government and   17 
households, i.e., inflation plays a crucial role to reconcile the contradiction in the difference of 
time preference rates between a government and households. People are forced to reconcile the 
contradiction  in  time  preference  rates  by  expecting  inflation  because  they  know  that  the 
Leviathan government has no intention to be forced to default in any situation even if its budget 
constraint may not be satisfied.
22  Theorem 2 indicates that if there is heterogeneity in time 
preference rates between a government and households, it will be impossible to construct a 
model of a stable economy without inflation, simply because there will be no other way to 
reconcile the contradiction in the time preference rates than inflation. 
 
3.2 Persistence   
          It is a stylized fact that inflation has a nature of persistence. It is well-known that US 
inflation showed high persistence particularly in 1960s and 1970s.
23  In the New Keynesian 
theory, this nature of persistence is a puzzle that is difficult to be solved.
24  However, the model 
in the paper has a feature of persistence intrinsically because inflation rates have a unit root at 
the steady state.   
 
Proposition 1: Inflation rates have a unit root at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & , 
0 = t c &   and  0 = t k &   if 
t





− =   at the steady state.   
 
Proof: By lemma 2,  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − + = + 2 1   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & , 
0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & . Hence,  ( )
P G
t t θ θ π π − = − + 2 1   at the steady state. 
                                                           
22  This is the very point Buiter (2002, 2004) criticizes. He has denounced the FTPL as a fallacy for the reason that if 
default is rule out, budget constraints must be satisfied always by any economic agent.   
23  See e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2001) and Stock (2001). 
24  See e.g. Holden and Driscoll (2003).     18 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
          Persistence may be also observed in transition periods. Even though an economy is not at 
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−   are  relatively  small 
compared to 
G θ   and 
P θ ,  price movements  (inflation/deflation)  will  be observed  to have a 
nature of persistence.     
 
3.3 Debts and inflation 
          Government’s debts  t b   are constant at the steady state although inflation rates follow 
theorem 2.   
 
Remark 1:  0 = t b &   at the steady state such that 0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c & , and  0 = t k &   if 
t





− =   at the steady state, and the amount of government’s debts at the steady 







− = . 
 
Proof: By condition (4) and corollary 1,  ( ) t t t
G
t t t t t t t t s x g θ b s x g π R b b − − + = − − + − = &  







− =   at  the  steady  state,  then 




t t θ b θ b b &   at the steady state. 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
The amount of government’s debts bt at the steady state depends on  t t t
G s x , g , θ and , and thus 
it depends on the functional form and the values of parameters in government’s utility function   19 
G u . These results, i.e. firstly  0 = t b &   while  0 ≠ t π &   and secondly bt depends on 
G θ   and 
G u , 
imply  that  the  relationship  between  inflation  and  government’s  debts  will  be  unclear  and 
inconclusive in empirical studies if liner relations between them are assumed.
25 
          Remark  1  will  also  contribute  to  the  argument  over  fiscal  sustainability,  because  the 
nominal interest rate Rt and inflation rate  t π   are endogenous in the model although they are 
fixed ad hoc in most existing studies regarding fiscal sustainability. More importantly, the key 
that distinguishes the model from the existing models is the inclusion of the time preference rate 
of government 
G θ   that plays a crucial role in remark 1. 







− =   does not hold at the steady state, government’s debts bt are sustainable by 
lemma 1and there is no possibility of default.
26   
 
3.4 Hyperinflation 




Remark 2: If 
G θ   becomes extremely high while 
P θ   stays at the usual value, inflation rates 
extremely increase. 
   
          What will make 
G θ   extremely high? Higher rates of time preference mean very myopic 
                                                           
25  See e.g. Karras (1994), Darrat (2000), or Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002). 
26  Of  course  there  is  a  possibility  of  default  if  a  government  borrows  money  from  foreigners  over  whom  the 
government has only limited authority. 
27  Hence, a hyperinflation is not caused by the growth of money. This view is consistent with the conclusion of 
Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002). They conclude that causation (in the Granger sense) runs from inflation to money 
growth, and that once inflation has been triggered, monetary policy has typically been accommodative.     20 
government’s behavior. It is likely that if a government is formed by a party that is expected to 
collapse soon and is never considered to come back to power, the government may behave very 
myopically. This situation will occur e.g. just after the defeat in a war. Hyperinflations were 
often observed just after the end of a regime, e.g. Germany after the WWI, Japan after the 
WWII,  and  Russia  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  In  those  transitional  periods, 
governments were very fragile and may have acted very myopically and thus it is highly likely 
that those transitional governments had very high 
G θ .     
          This result that the extremely myopic behavior of fragile governments is the source of 
hyperinflations appears quite natural and intuitively acceptable. It is not necessary to assume 
adaptive expectations or sunspots like the well-known hyperinflation model of Cagan (1956).   
Conversely, as Sargent (1982) emphasizes, a hyperinflation can be ended if 
G θ   becomes lower 
e.g. by replacing the incumbent government with a political party that has much lower rate of 
time preference.
28   
 
3.5 Chronic inflation   
          Theorem 1 and 2 also predict the existence of chronic inflations that were observed e.g. in 
1960s and 1970s in many industrialized countries. 
 
Remark 3: If inflation rates are not so high and 
P G θ θ −   is positive but not so small, the 
inflation rates increase steadily but stays low compared to hyperinflations in a relatively long 
period.   
   
Broadly speaking there are two views regarding chronic inflations. In the first view, chronic 
                                                           
28  Sargent  (1982)  emphasizes  that  a  credible  change  in  policies,  preferably  embedded  in  legal  and  institutional 
changes, could bring a hyperinflation to an end at very small cost.   21 
inflations are the result of the lack of policy-maker’s motive to stabilize inflation, and in the 
second view, the bad lucks or honest mistakes of policy-makers yield chronic inflations.
29  The 
view derived from the remark 3 will be categorized into the first view. Although governments 
know that  0 > −
P G θ θ   and thus inflation rates will accelerate, the Leviathan governments 
still purse their ideological policy objectives that are given higher priority. A chronic inflation 
will  end  if  the  incumbent  government  is  replaced  by  a  political  party  whose  rate  of  time 
preference is lower than that of households. On the other hand, if a party with higher rate of 
time preference rises to power, chronic inflation will be observed even if monetary authorities 
have correct information and there is no large negative shock.
30 
 
3.6 Disinflation, deflation and great depression 
          If  in  reverse 
P G θ θ −   is  negative,  disinflation  and  in  some  cases  deflation  will  be 
observed. Furthermore, a deeper deflation has the possibility to fall into a great depression.   
 
Proposition 2: If  0 < −
P G θ θ , then in a finite period an economy becomes unstable.   
 
Proof:  If 0 < −
P G θ θ ,  then  by  theorem  2,  0 < − =
P G
t θ θ π &   at  the  steady  state  and  by 
assumption (A1), the decrease of inflation rate  t π   accelerates as time passes. Hence, in a finite 
period 
e
t b π ,   exceeds 
P




t b t π θ π r . However, the nominal interest rate 
e
t b t t π r R , + =   cannot be negative due to the zero bound, i.e. 
e
t b t t π r R , 0 + = ≤ . Thereby in the 
case  that  0 , < +
e
t b
P π θ ,  then 
e
t b t t
e
t b
P π r R π θ , , 0 + = ≤ < +   and  thus  t
P r θ <   ,  i.e.  the  real 
interest rate is higher than the rate of time preference of households in any period. Hence, an 
                                                           
29  See e.g. Collard and Dellas (2004). 
30  Collard and Dellas (2004) shows that explanations that take the second view that the bad lucks or honest mistakes 
of policy-makers yield chronic inflations require an implausibly severe recession to generate a chronic inflation.     22 
economy can not reach the steady state such that  0 = = t t k c & & . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
          Imagine that there is a shock to 
P θ   that makes 
P θ   increases drastically.
31  In this case, 
an  economy  will  fall  into  a  severe  recession  because  the  higher 
P θ   makes  the  output  and 
consumption lower. In addition, if the increase of 
P θ is so large that 
e
t b π ,   exceeds 
P
t θ r =  
immediately,  by  proposition  2  the  economy  becomes  unstable  instantly.  This  devastating 
situation may explain part of the development of the Great Depression.
32  In this situation, if the 
government is replaced by a political party with the higher rate of time preference 
G θ   that 
matches the increased rate of time preference of households, instability of the economy will be 
prevented although the higher 
P θ   still makes the output and consumption lower.
33   
 
                                                           
31  The concept of time-varying time preference has a long history, dating back to the era of Böhm-Bawerk (1889) 
and Fisher (1930), and the possibility of hike of time preference rate is not deniable. A mechanism of time-varying 
time preference is examined in detail in Harashima (2004a, c).   
32  A moderate deflation such that  P
t
e
t b θ r π = < ,   dose not destabilize an economy. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) 
concludes that there is no empirical relationship between deflation and depression except for the Great Depression. 
33  The Japanese economy experienced a protracted slump that has been often pointed out to be analogous to the 
Great Depression. They are similar in the sense that the nominal interest rates were zero and the economies appear to 
have been in a “liquidity trap.” However, there is a very different aspect, i.e., the loss of output was much larger in 
the Great Depression than in the slump of Japan in 1990s. This difference may be explained by both governments’ 
different responses to these situations. The Hover administration did not change economic policies in the early stage 
of the Great Depression, but in Japan the government drastically changed economic policies in early 1990s and 
increased the expenditure of public works hugely and issued huge government’s bonds. These different responses 
may have led to the different consequences that in the U.S. 
G θ   stayed low and thus the economy became instable 
but in Japan 
G θ   increased sharply and thus the economy escaped from instability.   23 
III. THE RELATION TO EXISTING MODELS 
 
1. The fiscal theory of the price level 
          In the FTPL and also in the quantity theory of money, the utility function of government 
is not explicitly assumed. Nevertheless, it can be shown that it is implicitly assumed in those 
theories  that  the  utility  function  of  government  is  such  that 
( ) ( ) constant exp ,
0 0 = − ∫
∞
dt t θ x g u E
G
t t
G   for any  t t x g and   and thus  constant =
G u .   
 
Proposition 3: If the utility function of a government is a special one such that  constant =
G u , 
then  the  optimality  conditions  for  the  government  are  (i)  the  budget  constraint 
( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = &   and (ii) the transversality condition.   
 
Proof: Let HamiltonianH be 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t
G
t t
G s x g π R b λ t θ ,x g u H − − + − + − = exp   where  t λ   is  a  costate  variable. 
The optimality conditions are   




H ,     
























− = ,           
(10)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t b λ .         
          If the utility function of the government is that  constant =
G u , then conditions (6) and   24 














H   thus  0 = t λ , and thereby conditions (6) and (7) 
hold  for  any  t t t t
e
t b s , x , g , π , π and ,   in  any  period.  In  addition  in  case  0 = t λ ,  condition  (8) 
( ) 0 = − − = t t t
t π R λ
dt
dλ   holds for any  t t t t
e
t b s , x , g , π , π and ,   in any period.   
          Hence, the optimality conditions are condition (9) and the transversality condition (10). 
Here, condition (9) is equivalent to the budget constraint  ( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & . As 
a result, if the utility function of the government is a special one such that constant = G u , then 
the optimality conditions are (i) the budget constraint  ( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = &   and (ii) 
the transversality condition. 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3 indicates that both the FTPL and the quantity theory  commonly base upon a 
special utility function of the government such that  constant =
G u   and thus both theories are 
arguing about the interpretation of the budget constraint and the transversality condition. In this 
case  t t t
e
t b x , g , π , π and ,   are  indeterminate  since  conditions  (6)  and  (7)  hold  for  any 
t t t
e
t b x , g , π , π and ,   in  any  period.  To  fix  these  variables,  it is  necessary  to  make  either  prices 
t
e
t b π π and ,   or  government’s  behavior  t t x g and   be  exogenously  given.  In  the  FTPL,  the 
former option, i.e. prices  t
e
t b π π and ,   are assumed to be exogenous and the government adjusts 
gt  and  xt  for  bt  not  to  explode,  is  called  Ricardian  and  the  latter  option,  i.e.  government’s 
behavior gt and xt are exogenous and prices  t
e
t b π π and ,   are adjusted for bt not to explode is 
called non-Ricardian.
34  Both options are theoretically possible and it appears difficult to judge a 
                                                           
34  As  Kocherlakota  and  Phelan  (1999)  argues,  in  the  Ricardian  regime,  the  control  of  money  supply  on  the 
assumption of the quantity theory of money is not sufficient to pin down the time path of inflation rate. Traditionally   25 
priori which option describes the world more correctly.
35  Nonetheless, taking proposition 3 into 
consideration, the argument which of the Ricardian and the non-Ricardian is correct seems to be 
infinitely inconclusive because both options commonly base upon a very special utility function 
of government such that  constant =
G u   for any  t t x g and . 
          While  the  FTPL  has  argued  vaguely  about  government’s  behavior  regarding  fiscal 
policies, the paper investigated it in detail and found that, in government’s behavior, the rate of 
time  preference  is  crucial  for  inflation.  Inflation  is  caused  not  by  deficits  or  accumulated 
government’s debts but by the time preference rate of government. The budget constraint is still 
a constraint of a government that is used when the government solves its optimization problem. 
In these senses, the model in the paper is different from the FTPL. However, it should be noted 
that the conclusion in the paper is same as that of the FTPL in the sense that the price level is 
determined not by monetary factors but by fiscal factors. Hence, the model in the paper should 
be regarded not as denying the FTPL but as presenting a microfoundation of the FTPL, i.e. 
specifying a non-Ricardian fiscal policy rule that is reasonable and more importantly derived 
from optimization of government. 
 
2. The monetary policy rule 
          In the conventional models of monetary policy, three kinds of equations, i.e. the equation 
that describes monetary transmission channels, a Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a monetarist type rule, e.g. purely speculative time trends in velocity, has been often assumed implicitly. 
35  “Ricardian” and “non-Ricardian” are interpreted as depicting fiscal policy rules. Having only the budget constraint, 
it is necessary to introduce a fiscal policy rule that determine how a government behaves for expenditure to fix the 
price  level.  If  we  assume  governments  are  rational,  fiscal  policy  rules  should  be  results  of  the  optimization  of 
government. However, in most researches the Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal policy rules are merely introduced a 
priori  without  considering  the  optimization  of  government,  while  theorem  2  in  the  paper  is  a  result  of  the 
optimization of government.   26 
determine the movement of inflation.
36  As is well-known, monetary transmission mechanisms 
and the Phillips curve are even now controversial. However, the law of motion for price in the 
model in the paper is irrelevant to any of the above three kinds of equations. Hence, in the 
model, there is no influence of monetary authorities on inflation since the time preference rates 
of  government  and  households  determine  the  rate  of  inflation.  Governments,  not  monetary 
authorities, determine the rate of inflation through their policy stances that are reflected in the 
rates of time preference. Monetary authorities may be seen effective for managing inflation only 
in the case that changes of monetary authority’s policies are backed by governments and thus 
people  think  that  the  time  preference  rates  of  governments  change  coincidentally  with  the 
changes of monetary policies. Without support of a government, a policy change independently 
determined  by  a  monetary  authority  may  fail  because  people  do  not  think  that  the  time 
preference rate of the government coincidently changed. This conclusion is similar to that of the 
FTPL in the sense that a tough and independent monetary authority is not sufficient to guarantee 
price stability but needs also an appropriate fiscal policy.
37   
          However,  the  above  result  will  not  deny  the  existence  of  the  conventional  monetary 
transmission  mechanisms  in  any  time.  Probably  the  conventional  mechanisms  are  valid  for 
short-term disturbances of inflation, while theorem 2 in the paper will prevail in the long-run. If 
so, how can the Taylor rule be interpreted in the framework of the paper? The Taylor rule is 
regarded as describing the Fed’s behavior well. The Taylor rule for the stochastic inflation rate 
#
t π   and the stochastic output gap 
#







t ηy π π µ π r i + − + + = ,     
where it is the central bank’s policy rate, r
* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π
* is the inflation 
                                                           
36  See e.g. Svensson (1999) or Mankiw (2001). 
37   For  example,  Cochrane  (2000)  contends  that  monetary  policy  may  be  intrinsically  irrelevant  to  price 
determination.   27 
target of the central bank, and 
#
t π   is the stochastic inflation rate. The Taylor rule may be useful 
to stabilize short-term fluctuations of inflation caused by various shocks under the following 
assumptions, particularly if the central bank can control the nominal interest rate, although the 
long-run inflation is dominated by theorem 2.   
 
Assumptions: 
    (A4) The central bank can control its policy rate it at will. 
    (A5) At the steady state such that  0 = = t t k c & & , 
* *
v t t π r i E + = +   for any v ( > 0). 
    (A6) The stochastic inflation rate 
#
t π   is composed of a short term i.i.d. shock εt with mean 
zero and the non stochastic part of inflation rate πt that is analyzed in the previous sections and 
thus  t t
#
t ε π π + = .   
 
Assumption  (A4)  is,  needless  to  say,  necessary  for  monetary  policies  to  be  workable. 
Assumption (A5) is necessary for monetary policies to be useful because, if the nominal interest 
rate deviates from 
* * π r +   in the long run, the economy can not be stable.   
 
Proposition 4: If  0 = −
P G θ θ , then for an economy to be stable, the inflation target π
* of the 
central bank in the Taylor rule should be the current rate of inflation πt that is constant.     
 
Proof: By theorem 2, if  0 = −
P G θ θ , then πt is constant. Here if π
* is different from πt and 
thus  φ π π t






t ηy φ ε µ π r i + − + + = .   
Because  µφ π r i E t
*
v t t − + = +   for any v ( > 0) and thus  µφ θ µφ r π i E
P *
t v t t − = − = − +  
for any v ( > 0), then the expected real interest rate  t v t t π i E − +   ( t π is constant) is different from 
the rate of time preference of households 
P θ   in any time and thus it is impossible to be that   28 
* *
v t t π r i E + = + for any v ( > 0). Hence, an economy can not reach the steady state such that 
0 = = t t k c & & .   
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Since  the  long-run  inflation  rate  is  determined  by  theorem  2,  the  central  bank  must 
accommodate its long run policy to theorem 2 in a situation that the central bank can control the 
nominal interest rate. If the central bank does not accommodate its policy in the long-run, the 
economy will destabilize. 
 
Remark 4: By proposition 4, if  0 = −
P G θ θ , then the inflation target π
* of the central bank 
in the Taylor rule should be the current inflation rate πt even though the current inflation rate πt 
is high, say over 10 % annually. To reduce this high inflation rate, the government must be 
replaced by a political party that has the lower rate of time preference 
G θ   compared with the 
rates  of  time  preference  of  the  incumbent  government  and  households,  i.e.  the  difference 
between the rates of time preference should be changed to be that  0 < −
P G θ θ . 
         
          A question about the Great Inflation in 1960s and 1970s has been put forward: why didn’t 
the  governments  and  monetary  authorities  in  those  days  take  policies  to  reduce  the  rate  of 
inflation.  Some contend that the governments and  monetary  authorities in those days  cared 
inflation less compared with the governments and monetary authorities after 1980s, and some 
conclude that the governments and monetary authorities in those days took policies based on the 
biased estimation of output gaps.
38  Proposition 4 and remark 4 will present another kind of 
explanation that may be seen as a variant of the first explanation. That is, the governments in 
those  days  were  neither  strange  nor  different  from  the  ordinary  people  in  the  sense  that 
                                                           
38  See e.g. Collard and Dellas (2004).   29 
P G θ θ = , but being ordinary itself made the high rate of inflation persist because the current 
inflation  rate  πt  in  those  days  was  already  high.  To  reduce  this  high  inflation  rate,  the 
government needed to be replaced by a reform minded political party that had the far lower rate 
of time preference. The Reagan administration may have been such a government. 
 
3. The Phillips Curve 
          In  the  model  in  the  paper,  the  Phillips  curve  is  irrelevant.  However,  empirically  the 
short-run positive relation between inflation and output gaps has been observed. Behind this 
phenomenon,  there  may  be  a  short-term  mechanism  that  is  independent  of  the  mechanism 
described in the model in the paper. However, there is a theoretical possibility that theorem 2 
can generate the Phillips curve. 
          Suppose that initially 
P G θ θ = . If 
P θ   shifts upwards for some reasons, the production 
and  consumption  at  steady  state  in  an  economy  must  decrease.
39  In  reverse,  if 
P θ   shifts 
downward,  the  production  and  consumption  at  steady  state  in  an  economy  must  increases. 
Hence, after a shock to 
P θ , the production will deviate from its previous trend downward in 
case of an upward shift of 
P θ   and upward in case of a downward shift of 
P θ .
40  On the other 
hand, if 
P θ   shifts upward, the inflation rate will decrease due to theorem 2 and in reverse if 
P θ   shifts downward, the inflation rate will increase. As a result, when 
P θ   changes while 
G θ  
does not, a positive correlation between t π and t y ˆ will be estimated in transition periods where 
t t t y y y − = ˆ   and  t y   is  a  trend.  This  positive  correlation  between  t π   and  t y ˆ   may  be 
                                                           
39  Fluctuations of time preference rate have been regarded as natural phenomena since the era of Böhm-Bawerk 
(1889) and Fisher (1930). See e.g. Harashima (2004a, c).   
40  The transition path from the old steady state to the new steady state in case of shifts of 
P θ may be complex. It is 
examined in detail in Harashima (2004b).     30 
observed as a Phillips curve.
41   
          This  explanation  of the  Phillips  curve  does  not  require  any  friction.  In case  of  other 
shocks,  e.g.  technology  shocks  or  leisure  preference  shocks,  some  kinds  of  frictions  are 
basically necessary to explain the mechanism of the Phillips curve. 
 
4. The optimal fiscal policy 
          If the utility function and time preference rate of a government is a special one such that 
( ) t
P G c u u =   and 
P G θ θ = , then the optimization problem of the government is identical with 
that  for  the  optimal  fiscal  policy.  The  government  maximizes  the  expected  utility  of  a 
representative household that is same as the expected utility of the government. In this case, if gt 
















c u ,  and  thus  the 
optimality  conditions  in  the  case  of  ( ) t
P G c u u =   are  identical  to  those  in  the  case  of 
constant =
G u .  Hence,  the  theory  of  the  optimal  fiscal  policy  generally  assumes  the  tax 








c u .     
          Point is to whom it is optimal. In the theory of the optimal fiscal policy, the optimal 
situation is the situation where the expected utility of a representative household is maximized. 
This reflects the benevolent view of government.
42  Hence the optimal fiscal theory requires an 
unusual incentive that a government maximizes not its own expected utility but the expected 
utility of a representative household, although households maximize their own expected utilities 
and firms maximize their own profits. For this incentive to be rational for the government, the 
utility function and time preference rate of the government must be identical to those of the 
                                                           
41  It should be noted that Philips curves generated by the above mechanism have a possibility of shifts of curves 
according to changes of the rates of time preference of government and households. 
42  See e.g. Downs (1957).   31 
representative household in any time. As a result, the optimal fiscal policy implicitly assumes 
that only the political parties that have the same utility function and time preference rate as 
those of a representative household can win elections.
43  The theory of the optimal fiscal policy 
will be useful if this assumption is valid. However, as was argued in section II, in reality it will 
not be rare that the utility function and time preference rate of a government is different from 
those of a representative household and thus the assumption may often be violated. 
 
5. The theory of money 
          In this subsection, money is introduced into the model. The well-known money in utility 
model of Sidrauski (1967) is used as the model for households. A representative household 
maximizes the expected utility 






0 0  
subject to   
( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t t t g m r π c z w ra a − + + − + + = & . 
where  t t t m k a + = , and mt is the real money, wt is the real wage, and zt is the real government 
transfers.  It  is  assumed  that  ( ) t t k f r ′ = ,  ( ) ( ) t t t t k f k k f w ′ − =   and  the  lump-sum 
government  transfers  zt  is  equal  to  the  seigniorage  st  and  thus  t t t t m π m s + = & .  It  is  also 


















,m c u . As usual, it is assumed that although all 
households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when making decisions, each of 
households takes the amount it receives as given and independent of its money holdings. 
          At the same time, the government maximizes the expected utility, 
                                                           
43  This assumption is drawn from the theory of policy convergence. See the literature of the policy convergence, 
most of which base upon Downs (1957).   32 






0 0  
subject to   
( ) t t t t t t t s x g π R b b − − + − = & . 
 
Proposition 5: At the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & , the real 
quantity  of  money  mt  follows  the  law  of  motion  that  satisfies 
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2 0   where  c
*  is  ct  at  the  steady  state,  if 
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− =   at the steady state.   
 
Proof: 
(Step1) Let Hamiltonian  H   be 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t t t t
P
t t
P g m r π c z w a r λ t θ ,m c u H − + − − + + + − = exp   where  t λ   is  a 
costate variable, and ct and mt are control variables and at is a state variable. The optimality 
conditions for the representative household are   
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(14)  ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t t t g m r π c z w ra a − + + − + + = & ,               
(15)  0 lim =
∞ → t t t a λ .         33 
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  at the steady state. 
(Step2) As for the government, by the result of (Step1) such that  t
P r θ =   at the steady state 
such that  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & , and by theorem 2,  ( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 &   at the steady state such 
that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & , then  ( ) 0 2 π t θ θ π
P G
t + − = . This relation is 
independent of the real quantity of seigniorage and thus from the real quantity of money. 
(Step3)  Combining  the  results  of  (Step1)  and  (Step2)  yields  the  equation: 
( )


















2 0   at  the  steady  state  such  that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & , 
0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & .  Hence  the  real  quantity  of  money  mt  satisfies 















− + + =
∂
∂
2 0   at  the  steady  state  such  that  0 = t g & , 
0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & .   
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Because  inflation  rates  are  determined  by  theorem  2  and  is  independent  of  the  quantity  of   34 
money, the quantity of money is demanded based on the independently determined inflation rate 
and the utility obtained from actual transactions that are the exact role played by money. This 
result that central banks act passively shares the same view with Sargent and Wallace (1981) 
and the literature of the FTPL.   
          Proposition 5 has the following important implication.   
 
Corollary 2: The rate of return on money - t π is not necessarily equal to that on capital  t r .   
 
Proof: By proposition 5, at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & , 
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2 0   is  not  necessarily  zero.  Hence,  by 











exp ,  t t r π +   is also not necessarily zero, and 
thus the rate of return on money - t π is not necessarily equal to that on capital  t r . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 3: If  0 ≥ −
P G θ θ   and 
P θ π − > 0 , then  0 > + t t r π  at the steady state such 
that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k &   if 
t





− =   at the steady state. 
 








,m c u and  thus  by  condition  (11),  0 > t λ .  By  proposition  5, 
if 0 ≥ −
P G θ θ   and 








,m c u   at  the  steady  state.  Hence,  by 











exp ,  0 > + t t r π . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D.   35 
 
Corollary 3 predicts positive nominal interest rates. For both government and households, the 
nominal interest rate need not be zero to achieve optimality. This result gives a very different 
picture from that the well-known Friedman rule gives, but may be considered quite natural 
because in reality nominal interest rates are positive which is seen as normal. 
          In addition, proposition 5 predicts the negative marginal quantity of money. 
 









m   at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & ,  0 = t c &   and  0 = t k &  
if 
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− =   at the steady state. 
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,m c u . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 4 is consistent with the feature of the well-known money demand function of Cagan 
(1956), i.e. the higher the expected inflation, the lower will be the demand for real money. 
However, it should be noted that because inflation rates follow theorem 2, given the initial   36 
inflation rate  there is only  one  path  for  inflation  and thus  the  mechanism of hyperinflation 
Cagan (1956) shows does not exist in this model.
44     
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
          What is the ultimate source of inflation still remains as a central question for economists. 
It  is  reflected  in  the  recent  heated  debate  over  the  Fiscal  Theory  of  the  Price  Level. 
Kocherlakota  and  Phelan  (1999)  stresses  that  the  key  force  behind  the  FTPL  is  that  a 
government is fundamentally different from households. To find the true mechanism of inflation, 
therefore, we should make an investigation into the behavior of government more extensively. 
One of the reasons why many economists are skeptical about the FTPL may be that the concept 
of non-Ricardian policy is too general and non-Ricardian policies include too many fiscal policy 
rules, many of which may be unrealistic and absurd and lead to unfavorable and unacceptable 
consequences. Hence, it will be necessary to pin down such a non-Ricardian fiscal policy rule 
that may prevail in reality and, more importantly, is not an ad hoc exogenous fiscal policy rule 
but derived from optimization of government. We need, so to speak, a microfoundation of the 
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.   
          The  paper  examined  a  model  that  explicitly  included  a  government’s  maximization 
problem  in  the  conventional  general  equilibrium  framework.  According  to  the  literature  of 
political economy, e.g. Downs (1957) and Alesina and Cukierman (1990), it will not be rare that 
government’s  preferences  are  not  identical  to  those  of  a  representative  household.  More 
importantly, the paper adopted the Leviathan view of government, the most prominent reference 
of which is Brennan and Buchanan (1980).   
          The explicit inclusion of a government’s maximization problem produced a simple and 
                                                           
44  As was shown in remark 2, the model in the paper predicts a hyperinflation when the time preference rate of a 
government is extremely high.     37 
clear-cut result: inflation is ultimately caused by the difference of the rates of time preference 
between a government and households. This is an inevitable consequence of heterogeneity in 
time preference rates between a government and households. Without inflation, an economy can 
not be stable, and thus inflation plays a crucial role to stabilize an economy, i.e. to reconcile the 
contradiction in the time preference rates that will make rational agents confuse and unable to 
plan future economic activities rationally. This result appears quite natural because if we model 
an economy with heterogeneity in time preference rates between a government and households, 
it will be impossible to model a stable economy without inflation, simply because there will be 
no other way to reconcile the contradiction in the time preference rates than inflation. 
          This clear-cut result sheds new light on various phenomena of inflation, e.g. persistence, 
hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation, deflation and so on. For example, the model in the 
paper has the intrinsic nature of persistence, i.e. inflation rates in the model have a unit root. For 
another example, the model in the paper can be seen as a unified model that explains various 
types of inflation, e.g. hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation and deflation, by a single 
mechanism such that different combinations of the time preference rates of government and 
households generate various types of inflation.     
          This  result  also  gives  us  new  interpretations  of  the  existing  various  inflation  related 
models. For example, if money is included in the model, positive nominal interest rates are 
predicted,  which  is  in  sharp  contrast  to the  Friedman  rule.  For  another  example,  the  paper 
predicts  that  the  argument  between  the  FTPL  and  the  quantity  theory  will  be  infinitely 
inconclusive, because both theories equally correspond to a special case of the model in the 
paper, i.e. the utility of a government is constant in any time, and thus the optimality conditions 
of  the  government  are  reduced  to  only  two  equations,  i.e.  the  budget  constraint  and  the 
transversality condition. Nevertheless, in the sense that the price level is determined not by 
monetary factors but by fiscal factors, the conclusion in the paper is same as that of the FTPL 
and the model in the paper can be regarded as presenting a microfoundation of the FTPL. As   38 
Christiano  and  Fitzgerald  (2000)  argues,  so  far  the  non-Ricardian  assumption  has  not  been 
regarded as a good characterization of policy in all times and places, rather it has been seen as a 
concept that can be applied to only limited episodes. However, the result in the paper implies 
that a type of non-Ricardian policy rule, e.g. the rule found in the paper, prevails in most times 
and places. 
          The  novelty  of  the  paper  is  that  it  specifies  a  clear-cut,  simple,  easily  tractable  and 
reasonable non-Ricardian fiscal policy rule that is derived from optimization of government and 
is  the  basis  of  the  law  of  motion  for  price,  i.e.  it  establishes  a  realistic  and  reasonable 
microfoundation of the FTPL. The fundamental mechanism found in the paper is amazingly 
simple  and  beautiful:  ( )
P G
t θ θ π − = 2 & .  The  key  is  the  contradiction  in  the  rates  of  time 
preference between a government and households that must be reconciled by inflation. This 
simple equation bridges the gap between the real world and the nominal world. What should be 
stressed  repeatedly  is  that  this  equation  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  heterogeneity  in 
preferences  between  a  government  and  households,  and  if  there  is  heterogeneity  in  time 
preference rates between a government and households, we will not be able to construct a model 
of  a  stable  economy  without  inflation.  The  clear-cut,  simple  and  beautiful  mechanism  of 
inflation found in the paper may narrow down significantly the scope for investigation into the 
ultimate source of inflation.   
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Proof of corollary 1 
          By theorem 1 and assumptions (A1) and (A2), 
 
P G








  at the steady state such that  0 = t g & ,  0 = t x & , 
0 = t c &   and  0 = t k & . Hence, 
G
t t θ π R = −   due to 
P
t θ r =   at the steady state.   
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D. 
 
2. Proof of lemma 2 
          It is self-evident that the law of motion  ( )
P G
t ζ t θ θ ζ π π − + = + 2   follows theorem 1 
under assumptions (A1) and (A2) and does not have any cycle of length 1. 
          Here, assume that t π does not follow the law of motion  ( )
P G
t ζ t θ θ ζ π π − + = + 2   at a 
period t+µ and thus  ( ) κ θ θ ζ π π
P G




t v θ θ π dv π − = − ∫
+1
 
must be satisfied for any t by theorem 1 and assumptions (A1) and (A2), then it is necessary that 
( ) γ
P G
t γ t κ θ θ ζ π π − − + = + 2   for any  ( ) 1 + < < µ γ µ γ   where  κ dγ κ
µ
µ γ − = ∫
+1
.   




t v θ θ π dv π − = − ∫
+1
,  the  inflation  rate 
φ µ t φ π + + + → 1 0 lim   must  follow  ( ) κ θ θ ζ π π
P G
t φ µ t φ + − + = + + + → 2 lim 1 0   because  without  it 
P G P G
t
φ µ t




0 lim .  Hence,  there  is  a  cycle  of  length  1 
such that in every 1 term  t π   deviates by κ. This contradicts assumption (A3), thereby  t π   must 
follow the law of motion  ( )
P G
t ζ t θ θ ζ π π − + = + 2 . 
                                                                                                                                          Q.E.D.   40 
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